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INTERPOL MISUSE-A CASE STUDY: KAZAKHSTAN

A. De jure
The limits imposed on member states are explicitly set forth in Article
III of the ICPO-Interpol Constitution and General Regulations. Thus, it is
strictly forbidden for the organization to undertake any intervention or
activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character. According
to the interpretation given to Article III, a political offense is one that is
considered to be of a predominantly political nature because of the
surrounding circumstances and underlying motives, even if the offense
itself is covered by ordinary criminal law in the country in which it is
committed. This interpretation, based on the predominant aspects of the
offense, was first mentioned in a resolution adopted by the Interpol
General Assembly in 1951. A resolution adopted in 1984 states that, in
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general, offenses are not considered to be political when they are
committed outside a "conflict area," and when the victims are not
connected with the aims or objectives pursued by the offenders.
B. De facto
The principles seem sound, but how do they work in reality? What if
a member state abuses Article III and seeks to use the organization in
pursuit of its own authoritarian objectives? What if that member state
repeatedly invokes Interpol's apparatus but fails to carry forward its
obligation to obtain extradition of the detainee? That is precisely the case
that we describe here in relation to the actions of the repressive
Nazarbayev regime in Kazakhstan during 1999 and 2000, as it sought to
interfere and disrupt the political opposition and criminalize the activities
of the leading opposition figure, former Prime Minister Akezhan
Kazhegeldin.
II. BACKGROUND
In early October 1998, Kazhegeldin participated in an organizational
meeting of the "Movement for Free Elections" in anticipation of
presidential elections to be scheduled in Kazakhstan. Kazhegeldin had
emerged as the most viable opposition candidate to challenge incumbent
president Nazarbayev, the holdover president from the Soviet era.
Kazhegeldin was charged with an administrative violation for
participation in the activities of an "unregistered organization." He was
convicted while away from the country, i.e., in absentia, and subsequently
"disqualified" as a result of that conviction from becoming a candidate for
the office of president. Prior to his "disqualification," but in an effort to
discredit and intimidate him, Kazhegeldin was accused of income tax
evasion, abuse of office (bribe taking), illegal ownership of property
outside of the country (specifically real estate in Belgium), and other
economic crimes.
Each accusation was rebutted and disproved by
Kazhegeldin with specific evidence, and at considerable expense. The
international community, including OSCE, the United States Department
of State, and numerous human rights organizations, uniformly criticized
the eventual "reelection" of President Nazarbayev.
Following the elections, Kazhegeldin continued his efforts to
reform the political and economic conditions in Kazakhstan by supporting
efforts to create an independent media, establishing an opposition political
party (Republican Peoples Party of Kazakhstan "RPPK"), and criticizing
the Nazarbayev regime outside of the country before various governmental
forums.
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III. DETENTION IN MOSCOW-SEPTEMBER 1999
In May 1999, Kazhegeldin testified before the United States Congress
concerning conditions in Kazakhstan and was particularly critical of the
Nazarbayev regime. Shortly after his hearing before Congress, the Kazakh
authorities "reopened" the "tax investigation" that had been previously
closed upon a determination that all taxes had been paid and no criminal
activity had occurred in connection with the payments.
In early summer 1999, the Kazakhstan Security Police ("KNB"), the
successor to the KGB, requested Interpol to issue a Red Alert for the arrest
and extradition of Kazhegeldin. The purported reasons for his detainment
were the 1997 tax charge against Kazhegeldin and the allegations of
misconduct with respect to property he allegedly owned in Belgium.'
While traveling to Russia to meet with political activists and members
of the RPPK who were organizing for Parliamentary Elections in
Kazakhstan, Kazhegeldin was temporarily detained by Russian police
authorities on the basis of the Interpol Red Alert. When the General
Prosecutor of Kazakhstan was unable to provide sufficient evidence to
support an arrest or extradition, Kazhegeldin was released. According to
the contemporaneous press accounts, the Russian General Prosecutors
Office studied the charges brought against Kazhegeldin and came to the
conclusion that the detention was not substantiated. By this action,
however, he was prevented from meeting with his political supporters and
from exercising rights guaranteed to him under the United Nations
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
IV. DETENTION INROME-JULY 2000

Again, in July 2000, while he traveling to Rome to pursue political
activities directed at advancing democracy and a free press in Kazakhstan,
Kazhegeldin was detained by Italian authorities on the basis of an Interpol
1. These are the same allegations that first arose during Kazhegeldin's effort to run for
president in 1998. In May 1999, Professor A. I. Khudyakov, a leading authority on Kazakh Tax
Law, who was directly involved in drafting the law, rendered an unqualified legal opinion that
"the criminal proceedings [against Kazhegeldin] were initiated without sufficient grounds." All
of the relevant facts concerning the handling of Kazhegeldin's receipt of income and payment of
his taxes, albeit late, of his taxes made clear that the requisite intent to avoid payment was
absent. Indeed, on October 16, 1998, the Almaty Tax Committee confirmed that Kazhegeldin
had not engaged in any criminal activity with respect to the payment of his taxes. Likewise, the
persistent allegations concerning the ownership of property in Belgium were repeatedly
disproved, first by submission of certified land records showing the absence of any ownership of
property by Kazhegeldin and, ultimately, by securing a Court decision in the Dutch Court
establishing that Kazhegeldin never owned the property or corporation that the Kazakh authorities
alleged he did. Ironically, Nazarbayev's close political advisor and business partner owned the
property in Belgium.
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alert issued at the request of Kazakhstan KNB. The request was based on
the same previously rejected allegations and a "new," equally frivolous,
allegation that Kazhegeldin was engaged in "terrorism."
Again, the
Kazakhstan General Prosecutor was not able to justify the arrest and
extradition of Kazhegeldin. The Justice Ministry announced that the Rome
Appeals Court had ordered Kazhegeldin's release from preventative
detention after concluding that there were no grounds to detain him.
V.

AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONALLY REPUGNANT
TRIAL INABSENIA

In March 2001, Nazarbayev signed a most pernicious law permitting
the trial and conviction of Kazakh citizens "in absentia." This new law is
regionally known as the "Kazhegeldin Amendments" and has been
employed to obtain a conviction "in absentia" of former Prime Minister
Kazhegeldin of the very same charges that have been leveled against him
since 1998 when he challenged Nazarbayev for the presidency.2 The
conviction was assailed as particularly unfair by the OSCE whose
representatives in Kazakhstan personally observed the "trial."
The
conviction was also the subject of a formal demarch issued by the United
States Department of State. The Nazarbayev regime, yet again, has used
this false "conviction" as the basis for requesting that Interpol use its
apparatus to detain Kazhegeldin as an enemy of the state. The obvious
objective of the request is to stifle dissent and to interfere with the political
rights of the Kazakhstan opposition.
VI. A SOLUTION
The adage that "every dog is entitled to one bite" seems apt. Here,
the authoritarian Nazarbayev regime has now demonstrably had "two"
bites. No matter how vicious or rabid its attempts have proven to be, on
both occasions it has been unprepared to present justification or credible
basis for the obvious interference with protected political activities of the
opposition within the country. Having twice acted in direct contravention
of Article III's prohibitions against use of the organization to interfere with
"predominantly political" activities, Kazakhstan police authorities should
2. Recognizing that it had on at least two prior occasions failed to convince a legitimate
and objective "trier of fact" (e.g., Russian and Italian authorities, among others) that the charges
were justified or credible, the Nazarbayev regime now tried Kazhegeldin not for taking bribes,
but rather for soliciting them. Of course, those who testified against him and claimed to have
made the bribes were close supporters of the regime, in fear of the own status in the country, or
persons with motives to fabricate the charges. The court sitting in judgment of Kazhegeldin was
comprised of a single Supreme Court judge who had been personally appointed by Nazarbayev
and was related to him. His judgment is not appealable.
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not be permitted to use the organization's apparatus. Kazakhstan should
first establish, in a competent and credible forum, that the request is not a
further violation of Interpol's constitution and regulations. In these
circumstances Interpol, or some judicial authority outside of the member
state, should make an initial determination that the request is legitimate.
The burden should then shift to the member state seeking use of the
organizations apparatus to explain, justify, and establish credible basis for
a detention.

